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BERNARD CHAO* 
Abstract: Given our adversarial system, it is not surprising that plaintiffs ad-
vance creative damages theories that would help them maximize their recov-
eries. In patent law, one recurring tactic for patentees is to seek remedies 
based on the entire infringing product instead of the specific feature covered 
by the patent. This distinction can significantly inflate remedies because mod-
ern multicomponent products contain thousands, sometimes hundreds of thou-
sands, of different features. Thus, entire products are orders of magnitude 
larger, more complex, and more valuable than individual features.  
In recent years, the Supreme Court has sensibly rejected attempts to base pa-
tent remedies on entire products in the context of permanent injunctions and 
design patents. The Federal Circuit nonetheless continues to allow patentees 
to recover all the lost profits associated with an entire infringing product even 
when the patent at issue only covers one aspect of a multicomponent product. 
In Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc., the Federal Circuit recently af-
firmed a $36,417,661 award, giving the patentee all of the lost profits caused 
by the sales of the defendant’s infringing semiconductor emulator systems. 
The patent, however, covered only one feature of the defendant’s product. The 
court explicitly rejected attempts to apportion profits between those attributa-
ble to the patented feature and other significant factors.  
This Article argues that the failure to consider apportionment is wrong on 
both the law and policy. From a doctrinal perspective, the Federal Circuit has 
misinterpreted Supreme Court precedent, dating back to the nineteenth centu-
ry, to arrive at an overly simplistic “but for” test to assess damages. From a 
policy perspective, awarding lost profits based on the entire infringing prod-
uct—rather than just the feature—compensates the patentee for value she did 
not create and deters innovation in technologies that operate with or build up-
on other technology (“complementary technology”). Accordingly, this Article 
argues that it is time to realign the lost profits doctrine to make it consistent 
with other types of patent remedies. Patentees should only be compensated 
based on the value of the patent they hold. That means focusing the remedy on 
the infringing feature and not the infringing product. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In an adversarial legal system such as ours, parties are incentivized to 
seek the greatest possible recovery from a legal action. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that plaintiffs advance creative damages theories that would help 
them maximize their recoveries. In patent law, one recurring tactic for pa-
tentees is to seek remedies based on the entire infringing product instead of 
the specific feature covered by the patent. This distinction can significantly 
inflate remedies because modern multicomponent products contain thou-
sands, sometimes hundreds of thousands, of different features. Entire prod-
ucts are orders of magnitude larger, more complex, and more valuable than 
their individual features. For example, a smartphone is far more than just 
the beveled shell that holds its electronics or the software that allows a user 
to unlock the phone with a single swipe (two separately patented features on 
Apple’s iPhone).1 Numerous different innovations contribute to the success 
of multicomponent products, and awarding all of a product’s lost profits 
based on one invention would crowd out returns for other important tech-
nologies that contribute to the success of these products. 
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has sensibly rejected 
attempts to base patent remedies on entire products in the contexts of both 
permanent injunctions and design patents.2 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit nonetheless continues to allow patentees to 
recover all of the lost profits associated with an entire infringing product, 
even when the patent at issue only covers one aspect of that product. In 
2017, in Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc., the Federal Circuit af-
firmed a $36,417,661 award, giving the patentee all of the lost profits 
caused by sales of the defendant’s infringing semiconductor emulator sys-
tems.3 This decision explicitly rejected attempts to apportion profits be-
tween those attributable to the patented feature and other significant factors 
unrelated to the patented feature. 
This Article argues that the failure to consider apportionment is wrong 
on both the law and policy. From a doctrinal perspective, the Federal Circuit 
has misinterpreted Supreme Court precedent, dating back to the nineteenth 
century, to arrive at an overly simplistic “but for” test to assess damages. 
From a policy perspective, awarding lost profits based on the entire infring-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See U.S Patent No. 8,046,721 (issued Oct. 25, 2011) (swipe to unlock feature); U.S. Patent 
No. D618,677 (issued June 29, 2010) (phone shell). The patent for the later-developed slide to 
unlock feature was found invalid as obvious. See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 816 F.3d 788, 
806 (Fed. Cir. 2016), reinstated in part, vacated in part, 839 F.3d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 2 See, e.g., Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016) (design patents); eBay 
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (permanent injunctions). 
 3 851 F.3d 1275, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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ing product compensates the patentee for value that he or she did not create 
and deters innovation in complementary technology (i.e. technology that 
operates with other technology to create products). Accordingly, this Article 
argues that it is time to realign the lost profits doctrine to make it consistent 
with other types of patent remedies. Patentees should only be compensated 
based on the value of the patent that they hold. That means focusing the 
remedy on the infringing feature and not the infringing product. 
The issue in Mentor Graphics is just the latest battleground in one of 
patent law’s most fundamental debates. Some commentators think of pa-
tents as a kind of private property.4 The most straightforward implication of 
this view is that a prevailing patentee should be able to obtain a permanent 
injunction as a “matter of course.”5 Most commentators, however, now 
think of patent law as a type of policy lever, even seeing it as a kind of 
regulation.6 In this vein, both courts and commentators rely on patent law’s 
goal of promoting innovation as their guiding principle.7 To the extent that 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal Re-
sponse to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L.  REV. 455, 461 (2010) (“The basic principles of proper-
ty law are alive and well, and they are capable of reasonable extension to all forms of intellectual 
property.”); see also Bernard Chao, Causation and Harm in a Multicomponent World, 164 U. PA. L. 
REV. ONLINE 61, 67–74 (2016) [hereinafter Chao, Causation and Harm], http://scholarship.law.
upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1158&context=penn_law_review_online [https://perma.
cc/6RRM-RUCA] (discussing how the Federal Circuit’s view of patents as property contributed to 
the weakening of the “causal nexus” test for assessing irreparable harm); F. Scott Kieff, Property 
Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 703 (2001) 
(noting that “the treatment of patents as property rights is necessary to facilitate investment in the 
complex, costly, and risky commercialization activities required to turn nascent inventions into 
new goods and services”); Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The His-
torical Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 701 (2007) (noting 
that courts and Congress have historically classified “patents as property rights”). 
 5 See Epstein, supra note 4, at 489 (“In the patent context, this basic element of property theo-
ry has long been held ‘to provide for an exclusive right to inventors to make, use and vend their 
inventions,’ leading to the creation of a ‘complete monopoly’ for which injunctive relief is re-
quired as a matter of course.” (quoting Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 
423 (1908))). 
 6 See Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Meta-
phor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1325 (2004) (asserting that patent law should 
be viewed as “economic regulation that overlaps with administrative law”); Mark A. Lemley, The 
Regulatory Turn in IP, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 109, 110 (2013) (discussing how patent law 
could be viewed as both similar to property, as well as a “regulatory intervention” that limits 
property rights); Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. 
REV. 517, 566 (2014) (proposing that “patent law remedies should be viewed . . . as part of a larg-
er regulatory mechanism grounded in public law concepts”). One need not, however, accept the 
regulatory view of patent law to believe that innovation is its goal. After all, the Constitution 
speaks in terms of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science” when discussing patent rights. U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 7 See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 649 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (expressing 
concerns about “stifl[ing] . . . progress” of “scientific and technological work” when discussing 
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inventors receive financial rewards, it is simply a byproduct of encouraging 
innovation.8 Advocates of the policy lever view worry that giving strong 
remedies for patents on a single feature will discourage complementary in-
novation; inventions that work with or build on the work of others.9 For 
example, two scholars criticized the prior rule of presumptively issuing 
permanent injunctions to prevailing patentees based on concerns about “pa-
tent holdup.”10 In 2006, in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme 
Court changed that rule, holding that the courts must now weigh four equi-
table factors in determining whether to issue a permanent injunction.11 Alt-
hough the result in eBay was clearly at odds with the property view of pa-
tents, the reasoning in Justice Thomas’s majority opinion did not engage in 
this dispute. Rather, it relied on principles from other substantive areas of 
the law.12 This has allowed both property advocates and their opponents to 
continue their debate in other doctrinal areas of patent law, including lost 
profits. 
Even though the Supreme Court has resolved the injunction issue and 
reduced the leverage that individual patented features have on entire prod-
ucts, the Federal Circuit continues to take a fundamentally different view 
when calculating lost profits. Given that the Federal Circuit has exclusive 
                                                                                                                           
patentable subject matter); Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 626 (2008) 
(discussing the role of patents in “promot[ing] the progress of science and useful arts” in the con-
text of patent exhaustion (quoting Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 
U.S. 502, 511 (1917))); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (noting that patent law’s 
purpose was “to bring forth new knowledge”); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294 (2003) (“The standard rationale 
of patent law is that it is an efficient method of enabling the benefits of research and development 
to be internalized, thus promoting innovation and technological progress.”). 
 8 See Motion Picture, 243 U.S. at 511 (“[T]his court has consistently held that the primary 
purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents but is 
‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts’ . . . .”) quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8)). 
 9 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 989, 1067 (1997) (asserting that if those who wish to improve upon an invention are 
forced to pay high prices to license the original invention, an “underproduction of improvements” 
will result); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 843–44 (1990) (“Without extensively reducing the pioneer’s incentives, 
the law should attempt at the margin to favor a competitive environment for improvements, rather 
than an environment dominated by the pioneer firm.”); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the 
Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 
29, 32 (explaining how giving original inventors broad patent protection “can lead to deficient 
incentives to develop second generation products”). 
 10 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
1991, 2008–10 (2007) (explaining how granting an injunction for infringement of single feature 
can give the patentee disproportionate bargaining power). 
 11 eBay, 547 U.S. at 388. 
 12 See id. at 391–92 (citing the “well-established principles of equity” and the right to exclude 
under property law). 
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appellate jurisdiction over patent law, this inconsistency is particularly trou-
blesome.  In Mentor Graphics, the court relied solely on “but for” analysis 
and awarded lost profits based on the entire infringing product.13 If a pa-
tentee cannot obtain an injunction against a single feature because the in-
junction can be used to holdup an entire product, recovering all of the lost 
profits caused by the infringing product should also not be allowed. In sum, 
the Federal Circuit’s approach to lost profits is clearly at tension with the 
Supreme Court’s decision on injunctions. Moreover, sound policy weighs in 
favor of reducing the leverage that patents on individual features, even im-
portant features, can exert. Otherwise, owners of these patents will be able 
to effectively control products that were created by a community of differ-
ent inventors. The solution is to apportion lost profits based on the relative 
contribution of the patented feature. 
Part I of this Article reviews the basics of modern patent lost profits 
law.14 Relying on the facts of Mentor Graphics, it then explains why the 
current test calculates lost profits based on an entire infringing product 
without considering what portion of those profits are actually attributable to 
the infringing feature.15 In other words, when calculating lost profits, patent 
law does not apportion. Part II takes a step back into history and explains 
why the modern view of lost profits is actually based on a misinterpretation 
of two longstanding Supreme Court cases, Yale Lock Manufacturing Co. v. 
Sargent and Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.16 
Part II then returns to the present to critically examine the Federal Circuit’s 
futile attempts to reconcile the Supreme Court’s historical apportionment 
requirement with the Mentor Graphics decision’s refusal to consider the 
value that other factors contributed to the infringing product.17 
Part III analyzes the issue of apportionment and lost profits from a pol-
icy perspective.18 It describes both eBay and Samsung Electronics Co. v. 
Apple Inc. and explains why the Supreme Court refused to allow injunctions 
and design patent damages to be based on an entire product in these cases. 
Part III then discusses further policy concerns, including issues of royalty 
stacking, multiple “but for” causes, and basic fairness.19 
                                                                                                                           
 13 Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1290. 
 14 See infra notes 20–59 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 42–59 and accompanying text. 
 16 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964); Yale Lock 
Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 549–51 (1886); see infra notes 60–125 and accompanying text. 
 17 Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1280; see infra notes 103–125 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 126–195 and accompanying text. 
 19 Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 433; eBay, 547 U.S. at 388; see infra notes 161–195 and accompa-
nying text. 
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I. MODERN LOST PROFITS DOCTRINE 
A. Lost Profits Basics 
The statute governing compensation for patent infringement, 35 U.S.C. 
§ 284, states: “Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the 
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no 
event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the 
infringer . . . .”20 Lost profits are generally sought when the infringer’s 
products compete with the patentee’s products.21 The lost profits remedy 
seeks to restore the patent holder to the financial condition that it would 
have occupied had there been no infringement.22 Reasonable royalties, on 
the other hand, are the minimum damages for those patentees who do not 
meet the requirements of lost profits.23 It is significantly more difficult to 
establish lost profits than reasonable royalties.24 Importantly, the recovery 
of lost profits does not have a punitive aspect.25 Other types of damages can 
be imposed for misconduct.26 
Probably the most well-known modern decision on lost profits is Pan-
duit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, decided by the Sixth Circuit in 
1978.27 Later in this Article, I will discuss this case in more depth.28 For 
now, it is sufficient to understand that Panduit requires patentees to prove 
four elements to recover lost profits. The patentee must show: “(1) demand 
for the patented product, (2) absence of acceptable noninfringing substi-
                                                                                                                           
 20 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
 21 See, e.g., Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1280. 
 22 Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978). 
 23 Zelin Yang, Damaging Royalties: An Overview of Reasonable Royalty Damages, 29 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 647, 649 (2014). 
 24 See Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 655, 657–58 (2009) (noting the difficulty of establishing lost profits); Yang, supra 
note 23 (noting that those who cannot meet the standard for lost profits can get reasonable royal-
ties). To establish lost profits, patentees must show that they would have been capable of profiting 
from the patent under the Panduit factors discussed below. See infra notes 27–31 and accompany-
ing text. Patentees seeking reasonable royalties are those unable to establish lost profits. Yang, 
supra note 23, at 650. The amount of reasonable royalties that such patentees receive is the market 
price for the licensing fee that the infringer would have paid the patentee to use the patent. Id. at 
651. 
 25 See Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating 
that “the purpose of compensatory damages is not to punish the infringer, but to make the patentee 
whole”). 
 26 See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (2016) (describing the 
standard for recovering enhanced damages for “egregious” infringement behavior); Octane Fit-
ness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756–57 (2014) (discussing the recov-
ery of attorney’s fees in exceptional cases). 
 27 Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1156. 
 28 See infra notes 97–102 and accompanying text. 
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tutes, (3) his manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand, 
and (4) the amount of the profit he would have made.”29 Each of these fac-
tors is intended to ensure that the patentee only receives damages for profits 
that it would have earned “but for” the infringement.30 For example, under 
the first factor, the patentee should not be able to recover lost profits unless 
the infringer’s customers would have demanded the patentee’s products in 
the absence of infringement. Similarly, under the second factor, lost profits 
are unavailable if the infringer’s customers would have chosen a legitimate, 
or non-infringing, third party supplier’s products instead of the patentee’s 
products. The third factor ensures that the patentee had the ability to supply 
any customers that would have purchased its products in the absence of in-
fringement. The fourth factor insists that profits be calculated based on the 
financial circumstances that would have existed but for the infringement. In 
other words, the lost profits calculation must account for how the market 
would have looked without the infringer. For example, the patentee might 
have incurred increased costs to supply more products. Or, it may have en-
joyed supra-competitive profits because the infringer was kept out of the 
market. In short, the four so-called Panduit factors use the same kind of 
“but for” causation analysis used in tort law.31 
B. Mentor Graphics 
The Federal Circuit issued its opinion in Mentor Graphics in 2017.32 
In one respect, it looks like an easy application of the Panduit factors be-
cause “but for” the defendant Synopsys’ infringement, the plaintiff Mentor 
Graphics would have captured Synopsys’ sales. Mentor Graphics and Syn-
opsys (the company that acquired EVE-USA), both made emulation and 
verification systems. These systems are incredibly complicated and expen-
sive. They are used to test semiconductor chip designs that contain up to 
two billion circuits.33 The profits on a single unit can exceed one million 
dollars.34 
                                                                                                                           
 29 Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1156. 
 30 See id. (stating that a patent owner must prove the four factors in order to receive damages 
for “the profits on sales he would have made absent the infringement”). 
 31 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 (AM. LAW. INST. 2000) (defining factual case 
of harm as occurring “when the harm would not have occurred absent the conduct”). 
 32 Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1275. 
 33 See MENTOR GRAPHICS, ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2016), http://s3.mentor.com/investor-relations/
FY16-annual-report.PDF [https://perma.cc/667W-5U55]. 
 34 See Transcript of Record for October 9, 2014 at 1918, Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, 
Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29720 (D. Or. Mar. 11, 2015) (Nos. 3:10-cv-954-MO, 3:12-cv-1500-
MO, 3:13-cv-579-MO) [hereinafter October 9, 2014 Transcript] (asserting, on behalf of Mentor 
Graphics, in its closing statement that the profit on the sale of a single unit was $1,121,000). 
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Mentor Graphics and Synopsys were embroiled in a large patent war, 
with each side alleging that the other party infringed its patents.35 In the 
end, only one patent made its way to the jury, a Mentor Graphics patent.36 
That patent, U.S. Patent No. 6,240,376 (“the ‘376 patent”), was entitled 
“Method and Apparatus for Gate-Level Simulation of Synthesized Register 
Transfer Level Designs with Source-Level Debugging.”37 It covered tech-
nology that allowed an emulator to obtain more information about the cir-
cuit by inserting “test probes” at certain points in the software.38 These 
probes in turn gave the emulator the ability to measure “intermediate val-
ues.”39 This additional information allowed chip designers to debug chip 
designs faster and more accurately.40 Mentor Graphics alleged that Synop-
sys’ ZeBu emulators used this technology and infringed the ‘376 patent.41 
In the damages portion of the trial, Mentor Graphics argued that “but 
for” the sale of forty-five of Synopsys’ infringing ZeBu emulators, custom-
ers would have purchased Mentor Graphics’ Veloce emulators instead.42 
Accordingly, Mentor Graphics asked for all of the profits that these poten-
tial sales would have generated.43 In response, Synopsys attempted to argue 
that any lost profits should be apportioned based on the relative contribution 
of the infringing feature.44 Indeed, focusing only on debugging, the Zebu 
emulators had many other important features, including: dynamic probes, 
static probes, flexible probes, memory access, and triggers.45 The trial court, 
however, did not permit Synopsys to offer evidence of the value that any of 
these other features contributed to the infringing ZeBu emulators.46 At trial, 
Mentor Graphics prevailed. The jury found that Synopsys infringed the ‘376 
patent and awarded Mentor Graphics $36,417,661 in lost profits.47 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1280–81. 
 36 Id. at 1280. The trial court granted summary judgments on the other patents finding that 
they were either invalid for various different reasons or that the infringement claims were barred. 
Id. 
 37 U.S. Patent No. 6,240,376. 
 38 Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1281. 
 39 Id. 
 40 See id. 
 41 Id. at 1282. 
 42 Id. at 1283; October 9, 2014 Transcript, supra note 34, at 1914. 
 43 Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1283. 
 44 Id. 
  45 See Transcript of Record for October 6, 2014 at 1303, Mentor Graphics, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 29720 (Nos. 3:10-cv-954-MO, 3:12-cv-1500-MO, 3:13-cv-579-MO). 
 46 Transcript of Record for October 8, 2014 at 1649, Mentor Graphics, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEX-
IS 29720 (Nos. 3:10-cv-954-MO, 3:12-cv-1500-MO, 3:13-cv-579-MO); see infra notes 158–159 
and accompanying text. 
 47 Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1283. Mentor Graphics asked for $47,191,819. October 9, 
2014 Transcript, supra note 34, at 1920. 
1330 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1321 
As the Federal Circuit noted, the facts in this case allowed for a “re-
markably simple” application of the Panduit factors.48 The lost profits at 
issue concerned sales that Synopsys made to Intel.49 Mentor Graphics suc-
cessfully argued that it would have sold its emulators to Intel if Synopsys’ 
emulators did not include two features covered by the ‘376 patent.50 For the 
purposes of appeal, Synopsys accepted those arguments as true.51 Synopsys 
also did not challenge a finding that there were no non-infringing alterna-
tives.52 Thus, a straightforward application of the Panduit factors led to an 
award encompassing all of the profits that Mentor Graphics would have 
made had it sold its emulators to Intel instead of Synopsys. 
Rather than challenging the factual findings, Synopsys argued that the 
trial court should have instructed the jury to discount any lost profits by on-
ly taking into account the relative contribution that the patented invention 
made to the entire product.53 This principle, known as apportionment, is 
already part of the reasonable royalty calculation.54 Although there is a his-
torical basis for also apportioning lost profits, that has not been a part of 
modern patent law.55 Mentor Graphics did acknowledge this precedent in 
name, but it ignored the substance of what apportionment requires.56 In-
stead, Mentor Graphics said that the patentee was entitled to be “made 
whole.”57 Under this view, the fact finder does not need to consider which 
lost profits should be attributed to the infringing feature and which should 
be attributed to other factors. 
In an intuitive sense, the Federal Circuit is absolutely correct. The only 
way to restore Mentor Graphics to the position that it would have held had 
Synopsys not sold any infringing products was to award Mentor Graphics 
all of its lost profits without apportionment. 
The problem with this kind of “but for” analysis, however, is that it 
improperly confuses harm caused by an infringing product with harm 
                                                                                                                           
       48 See Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1286. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 1286–87. 
 52 Id. at 1287. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[W]here 
multi-component products are involved, the governing rule is that the ultimate combination of 
royalty base and royalty rate must reflect the value attributable to the infringing features of the 
product, and no more.”); VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(“No matter what the form of the royalty, a patentee must take care to seek only those damages 
attributable to the infringing features.”). 
 55 See infra notes 60–72 and accompanying text. 
 56 Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1283 n.3. 
 57 Id. at 1290. 
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caused by an infringing feature. Patent remedies should focus on the in-
fringing feature, and the only way to properly determine the damages asso-
ciated with that harm is to apply apportionment principles. Mentor 
Graphics, nonetheless, does not stand alone. Modern lower court decisions 
have similarly refused to apply apportionment to lost profits.58 Part II of this 
Article explains how this view stems from a mistaken understanding of Su-
preme Court precedent dating back to the nineteenth century.59 
II. MISUNDERSTANDING “BUT FOR” PRECEDENT 
Even though apportioning lost profits has deep historical roots, modern 
cases like Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc., Inc. have generally 
rejected that concept.60 One scholar has provided a thorough account of the 
history of apportioning lost profits.61 He explained that “[b]etween 1854 
and 1915, the Supreme Court decided more than two dozen significant pa-
tent damages cases and in each, adhered to the rule that a patentee must sat-
isfy the apportion requirement to recover for infringement.”62 Many of 
these cases dealt with the remedy of restitution.63 Restitution allowed a pa-
tent holder to capture the infringer’s profits as opposed to awarding to the 
patentee profits it would have made absent any infringement (lost profits). 
Restitution was essentially eliminated by a 1946 amendment to the patent 
laws.64 This development should not have affected the applicability of ap-
portionment to lost profits calculations. After all, a few of the earlier deci-
                                                                                                                           
 58 See infra notes 66–72 and accompanying text. 
 59 See infra notes 60–125 and accompanying text. 
 60 See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 61 Eric Bensen, Apportioning of Lost Profits for Patent Infringement, LEXISNEXIS EMERGING 
ISSUES ANALYSIS (Apr. 2017), http://www.ericbensen.com/Resources/48.%20Apportionment%
20of%20Lost%20Profit%20for%20Patent%20Infringement.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4BM-HP2F] 
[hereinafter Bensen, Patent Infringement]; Eric E. Bensen, Apportionment of Lost Profits in Con-
temporary Patent Damages Cases, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH., Summer 2005, at 1, 23–45, http://vjolt.
org/wp-content/uploads/2017/Articles/vol10/issue3/v10i3_a8-Bensen.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CXJ-
LZBJ]  [hereinafter Bensen, Patent Damages Cases]. 
 62 Bensen, Patent Infringement, supra note 61, at 3 (citing Bensen, Patent Damages Cases, 
supra note 61, at 29–42). 
 63 See, e.g., Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 648 (1915) (“As 
the exclusive right conferred by the patent was property and the infringement was a tortious taking 
of a part of that property, the normal measure of damages was the value of what was taken.”). 
 64 See Act of Aug. 1, 1946, Pub. L. No. 587, 60 Stat. 778, 778 (1946) (codified as 35 U.S.C. 
§ 70 and subsumed into 35 U.S.C. § 285) (stating that “for [patent] infringement the complainant 
shall be entitled to recover general damages which shall be due compensation for making, using, 
or selling the invention, not less than a reasonable royalty”); John M. Golden & Karen E. Sandrik, 
A Restitution Perspective on Reasonable Royalties, 36 REV. LITIG. 335, 344 (2017) (explaining 
how the 1946 statute ended restitution as a remedy for utility patents). 
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sions concerned lost profits.65 Moreover, the concept of apportionment is 
equally suitable for recovering lost profits as it is to restitution. No matter 
how the patent holder is compensated, apportionment acknowledges that 
other factors beyond the patent at issue drive value. 
Modern courts have nonetheless paid little attention to this precedent. 
The explanations for rejecting it differ. One district court wrongly said that 
apportionment only applied to restitution.66 Several recent district court de-
cisions have relied on the absence of modern authority supporting appor-
tionment.67 In Mentor Graphics, the Federal Circuit temporarily relied on 
yet another rationale before revising its view. The original panel’s decision 
in Mentor Graphics conceded that apportionment applied to all types of 
patent damage recoveries, but argued that the Panduit factors somehow in-
corporated apportionment principles.68 Perhaps understanding that there 
was no basis for this conclusion, an en banc opinion (denying rehearing) 
relied on a wholly different basis.69 Rather than endorsing the idea that the 
Panduit analysis applied apportionment principles, the en banc opinion said 
that meeting the Panduit factors satisfied the entire market value rule, mak-
ing apportionment unnecessary.70 Although some commentators have advo-
cated for apportionment, others have agreed with how courts have recently 
viewed the lost profits doctrine.71 
Regardless of how they arrived at the test, modern decisions now say 
that the sole test for determining lost profits is a simple “but for” analysis, 
                                                                                                                           
 65 See Bensen, Patent Infringement, supra note 61, at 3 (explaining how some of the leading 
apportionment cases involved the recovery of lost profits); see also Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 
120, 121 (1884) (stating that patentees must apportion both “the defendant’s profits and the pa-
tentee’s damages between the patented feature and the unpatented features”). 
 66 See W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Carlisle Corp., 198 U.S.P.Q 353, 363–64 (D. Del. 1978). 
 67 See Brocade Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. A10 Networks, Inc., No. C 10-3428 PSG, 2013 WL 
10601009, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2013) (asserting that although the concept of apportionment 
was “appealing,” the defendant’s argument “has not cited any Supreme Court or Federal Circuit 
case requiring an apportionment when a patentee claims lost profits based on Panduit”). The court 
further stated, “Nor do any of the cases it does cite arise in the context of a Panduit-based lost 
profits claim.” Id.; see also Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Universal Remote Control, Inc., No. SACV 
12-00329 AG (JPRx), 2014 WL 12586737, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2014). 
 68 Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc., 851 F.3d 1275, 1287–88 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 69 See Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc. (Mentor Graphics II), 870 F.3d 1298, 1300 
(Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 70 Id. 
 71 See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, TEX. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J., Fall 2001, at 1, 28 (2001) (suggesting that there is no need to apportion lost profits); 
Brent Rabowsky, Recovery of Lost Profits on Unpatented Products in Patent Infringement Cases, 
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 281, 295 (1996) (“[A]pplication of the entire market value rule and the generic 
‘but for’ causation test eliminates the need for apportionment.”). 
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and they use that framework to reject apportionment.72 “But for” analysis 
and apportionment, however, are really two steps in a more comprehensive 
approach to lost profits. Ironically, the foundation for the current single-
minded focus on “but for” analysis is the 1886 Supreme Court decision of 
Yale Lock Manufacturing Co. v. Sargent that illustrates the two-step ap-
proach.73 
Although the Supreme Court applied “but for” analysis in Yale Lock, it 
also recognized that many factors beyond the patented invention caused a 
patent holder to lose profits, and it apportioned lost profits accordingly.74 
That message has been lost, as courts today have focused exclusively on 
Yale Lock’s “but for” causation language.75 The result is that modern lost 
profits doctrine fails to recognize the difference between an infringing fea-
ture and an infringing product, and thus overcompensates patent holders. A 
proper appreciation of this Supreme Court decision, however, can help re-
store apportionment to its proper role. 
A. Yale Lock’s Two-Step Test 
The patent at issue in Yale Lock covered the use of a particular kind of 
“turning-bolt” for use in a combination lock.76 The defendant’s sale of in-
fringing locks forced the patent holder to sell its own products at a lower 
price—one dollar less for one lock and two dollars less for another lock.77 
Modern terminology would classify this as a patent holder losing profits 
due to price erosion.78 The Supreme Court explained that lost profits must 
be calculated by examining the “difference between [the patent holder’s] 
pecuniary condition after the infringement, and what his condition would 
have been if the infringement had not occurred.”79 This is the well-known 
“but for” analysis language that later cases would repeatedly quote. Im-
                                                                                                                           
 72 See Bensen, Patent Damages Cases, supra note 61, at 22–23 (commenting that courts have 
“reduc[ed] a claim for lost profits to a simple ‘but for’ test, thereby allowing a patentee to recover 
its entire lost profit on a lost sale regardless of the contribution of the patent to those profits”). 
 73 Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 549–51 (1886); see infra notes 86–96 and 
accompanying text (describing later courts’ interpretations of Yale Lock). 
 74 Yale Lock, 117 U.S. at 549–51. 
 75 See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964). 
 76 Yale Lock, 117 U.S. at 542. 
 77 Id. at 548. Interestingly, although the underlying master’s decision found that the infring-
er’s sales had caused the patent holder to lose sales too, no lost profits were awarded for these lost 
sales. Id. at 549. 
 78 See McSherry Mfg. Co. v. Dowagiac Mfg. Co., 163 F. 34, 35 (6th Cir. 1908) (“The damag-
es claimed were on account of reduction of prices, the right to recover which stands on exactly the 
same ground as damages on account of lost sales.”). Although the typical lost profits case deals 
with lost sales and not price erosion, this distinction does not affect the analysis. 
 79 Yale Lock, 117 U.S. at 552. 
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portantly, the “but for” analysis is only the first step in Yale Lock’s damages 
determination. This step calculates the profits lost due to the sale of the in-
fringing products— here, the infringing combination locks. It does not, 
however, attempt to determine what profits were lost because of the infring-
ing feature—here, the turning bolt. That determination occurs in the second 
step of Yale Lock’s analysis. 
Yale Lock did not simply award the patent holder all of the profits it 
lost because of the sale of the infringing products. Instead, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the underlying decision and reduced the patent holder’s lost 
profits by fifty percent because of “other causes which gave to the defend-
ant an advantage in selling its locks.”80 Those other causes included third 
party patented technology found in the infringing lock, other “superior ex-
ternal attractions” found in the infringing lock, the “shape” of the infringing 
locks’ cases, and “commercial success” that the defendant was having in 
sales.81 Thus, the second step in Yale Lock’s analysis is apportioning the lost 
profits between the profits lost due to the patented invention, and those at-
tributed to other factors.82 Importantly, this second step did not just apply to 
minor infringing features. The infringing turning bolt in Yale Lock was 
found to be an “essential feature of the infringing locks,” and the Supreme 
Court characterized the infringement as causing the patent holder’s “entire 
loss.”83 
In sum, in Yale Lock, the Supreme Court applied a two-step analysis. 
In the first step, it used “but for” analysis to determine all of the lost profits 
attributable to the infringing product. Recognizing that the infringing fea-
ture was only part of the infringing product, the Court then proceeded to a 
second step. The Court apportioned lost profits between the patented feature 
and other contributions made by the infringer. Importantly, the Supreme 
Court did not just look at the product’s patented features when applying 
apportionment. It also considered other factors that may have contributed to 
the infringer’s profits. Yale Lock even used the modern term “apportion-
ment” when describing the concept.84 Of course, because of the second step, 
                                                                                                                           
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 549–50. In modern terms, the latter factor could consist of defendant’s brand recogni-
tion or superior marketing or manufacturing abilities. 
 82 In Yale Lock, the split between the invention and other factors was 50/50, and there was no 
indication that the numbers were derived from anything other than a crude estimate. 
 83 Yale Lock, 117 U.S. at 551–52. 
 84 Id. at 550. 
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the patent holder only recovered the portion of lost profits attributable to the 
infringing feature, differentiating Yale Lock from modern patent law.85 
B. The Supreme Court Drops Step Two 
The reason that the modern day understanding of Yale Lock stops with 
step one can be traced to the cursory analysis of calculating damages that 
the Supreme Court provided in 1964, in Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convert-
ible Top Replacement Co.86 This mistake is somewhat understandable, giv-
en that the Court was focused on a different issue. The relevant part in Aro 
focused on explaining what damages one responsible party (the contributo-
ry infringer) must pay when money has already been paid to the patent 
holder on behalf of another responsible party (the direct infringer).87 
A more detailed examination of Aro helps explain the misunderstand-
ing. The plaintiff Convertible Top’s patent covered a “top-structure for au-
tomobile convertibles.”88 The defendant Aro “produce[d] fabric components 
designed as replacements for worn-out fabric portions of convertible 
tops.”89 The primary issue on appeal was the level of knowledge that Con-
vertible Top had to prove to make out a case of contributory infringement 
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).90 The Supreme Court held that there must be a 
showing that Aro not only knew of the patent, but also that the use of the 
component would infringe the patent.91 
For our purposes, the important discussion in Aro dealt with damages. 
Even though neither party briefed or argued damages, the Supreme Court 
felt compelled to address what it believed to be a faulty assumption made 
by the parties.92 Specifically, the Court went out of its way to point out that 
if earlier payments made on behalf of the direct infringers (customers who 
purchased Ford automobiles) fully compensated the patentee for the in-
fringement, then Aro would owe nothing for contributing to the customers’ 
infringement.93 Before reaching that conclusion, however, the Court dis-
                                                                                                                           
 85 See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN 
SOLVE IT 53 (2009) (noting that much of patent law, including lost profits jurisprudence, assumes 
that a single patent covers a single product). 
 86 Aro, 377 U.S. at 502. 
 87 Id. at 512–13. 
 88 Id. at 478. 
 89 Id. at 479. 
 90 Id. at 481. 
 91 Id. at 491. 
 92 Id. at 502. 
 93 Id. at 512. Earlier, Ford had made payments on behalf of customers who purchased Ford 
automobiles. Id. at 493–94. Aro was contributing to these customers’ direct infringement by sell-
ing them replacement parts for their convertible tops. Id. 
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cussed what full compensation for patent infringement meant. Relying on 
the oft quoted passage from Yale Lock, the Supreme Court explained that 
patent damages restore a patent holder to the position that they would have 
occupied had there been no infringement.94 
Of course, this is only the first step in Yale Lock’s analysis. Aro does not 
mention the second apportionment step. This omission is not surprising given 
the context. Aro was explaining that the patent holder could not obtain a dou-
ble recovery from different joint tortfeasors.95 There was no reason to go into 
the details of how to calculate lost profits. Indeed, the term “lost profits” does 
not even appear in the decision. Moreover, Aro certainly did not grapple with 
the additional complexity that arises when considering apportionment. Courts 
and commentators alike have nonetheless relied on both Aro and Yale Lock to 
suggest that calculating lost profits boils down to applying a “but for” causa-
tion analysis and nothing more.96 As a result, the concept of apportionment 
has disappeared from modern lost profits doctrine. 
C. The Growth of “But For” Analysis 
Even though Aro’s discussion of “but for” causation was dicta, courts 
have clearly accepted Aro’s abridged version of Yale Lock as both accurate 
and complete. Consider Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, the 
Sixth Circuit’s 1978 decision that is widely cited for its four-factor test used 
to determine lost profits.97 Panduit relied on both Aro and Yale Lock for the 
proposition that damages for patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 284 
should be calculated using “but for” analysis.98 As stated earlier, each of 
Panduit’s four factors expresses a different aspect of “but for” analysis.99 
Despite quoting Yale Lock, Panduit does not suggest that apportionment is 
part of the lost profits calculation. In other words, Panduit relies on Yale 
Lock’s step one “but for” analysis yet omits its step two apportionment 
analysis. 
                                                                                                                           
 94 Id. at 507 (“[Patent damages] have been said to constitute ‘the difference between [the 
patentee’s] pecuniary condition after the infringement, and what his condition would have been if 
the infringement had not occurred.’” (quoting Yale Lock, 117 U.S. at 552)). 
 95 Id. at 512 (noting that the discussion “is but an application of the rule that full satisfaction 
received from one tortfeasor prevents further recovery against another”).  
 96 See infra notes 97–114. 
 97 Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978). 
 98 See id. (“[Patent damages] have been said to constitute ‘the difference between [the patent-
ee’s] pecuniary condition after the infringement, and what his condition would have been if the 
infringement had not occurred.’” (quoting Yale Lock, 117 U.S. at 552) (citing Aro, 377 U.S. at 
507)). 
 99 See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
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To be fair, the question of apportionment was not at issue in Panduit. 
The patent holder was unable to recover any lost profits because the Sixth 
Circuit held that it had failed to satisfy Panduit’s fourth factor.100 There was 
insufficient evidence to show the amount of profits the patent holder would 
have made but for the defendant’s infringement.101 Because the patent hold-
er had failed to show that it deserved any lost profits, the court did not need 
to discuss whether to apportion those profits or how to do so. The problem, 
however, is that most courts accept the Panduit factors as complete regard-
ing lost sales. Courts regularly instruct juries about the four Panduit factors 
without mentioning apportionment.102 
Panduit’s interpretation of Aro and Yale Lock hardly stands alone. In 
1995, in Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., an en banc panel of the Federal Cir-
cuit applied a “but for” analysis to extend the reach of lost profits recover-
ies.103 Quoting Aro, which was itself quoting Yale Lock, the Federal Circuit 
held that the patent holder’s lost profits could encompass additional sales 
that it would have made for products that did not use the patented inven-
tion.104 Interestingly, four of the judges took a contrary view and interpreted 
Aro in much the way this Article does. Judge Nies’ dissent argued that Aro 
was “simply addressing preclude[ing] double recovery” and that it did not 
hold that “but for” analysis was the only limitation on damages.105 The ma-
jority opinion avoided addressing this particular point, and subsequent deci-
sions continue to rely on Aro and Yale Lock to focus exclusively on “but 
for” analysis. 
                                                                                                                           
 100 Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1156. 
 101 Id. at 1156–57. 
 102 See, e.g., FEDERAL CIRCUIT BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
§§ 6.2–.4 (2016); NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 
§§ 5.3–.5 (2015). 
 103 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 104 Id. at 1545 (“The question to be asked in determining damages is ‘how much had the Pa-
tent Holder and Licensee suffered by the infringement. And that question [is] primarily: had the 
Infringer not infringed, what would the Patentee Holder–Licensee have made?’” (quoting Aro, 377 
U.S. at 507)). The court then went on to say: 
Recovery for lost sales of a device not covered by the patent in suit is not of course 
expressly provided for by the patent statute. Express language is not required, how-
ever . . . . [D]amages should be awarded “where necessary to afford the plaintiff full 
compensation for the infringement.” Thus, to refuse to award reasonably foreseeable 
damages necessary to make Rite-Hite whole would be inconsistent with the meaning 
of § 284.  
Id. at 1546–47 (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 654 (1983)). 
 105 Id. at 1558 (Nies, J., dissenting in part). Judge Nies’ opinion also relied on historical Su-
preme Court precedent apportioning lost profits to rebut the view that damages should be calculat-
ed using “but for” analysis. Id. at 1565–66. 
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The “but for” analysis in patent law is not boundless. The Rite-Hite 
majority noted that courts have used the concepts of “proximate cause” or 
“foreseeability” to limit damages.106 Applying those principles to patent 
law, the court said that, “[i]f a particular injury was or should have been 
reasonably foreseeable by an infringing competitor . . . that injury is gener-
ally compensable absent a persuasive reason to the contrary.”107 Although 
the foreseeability limitation is concerned with remote injuries, that limita-
tion does apply to the lost profits cases at issue here. Losing sales to an in-
fringing competitor is not a remote injury; it is entirely foreseeable. Thus, 
the issue is not whether to compensate the patentee for these injuries. The 
issue is simply determining the proper amount of compensation. Limitations 
based on proximate cause do not help determine that amount.108 
Notably, the current critique of Rite-Hite’s “but for” analysis has im-
plications for other areas of damages law beyond apportionment.109 It sug-
gests that several different damages theories are built upon shaky precedent, 
including Rite-Hite’s holding that patentees can recover lost profits for sales 
of unpatented products.110 It may also cause us to reconsider whether a pa-
tentee should be able to recover lost profits for so called “convoyed sales” 
or unpatented items sold with the patented item.111 Moreover,  my critique 
made elsewhere buttresses claims that “but for” analysis should take a back 
                                                                                                                           
 106 Id. at 1546 (majority opinion). 
 107 Id. Although Rite-Hite specifically addressed foreseeability, it also noted that other tools 
like “logic, common sense, justice, policy and precedent” have been used to limit legal responsi-
bility. Id. (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 42, 
at 279 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 108 Indeed, tort law has confronted similar issues. Prosser suggests that once causation is es-
tablished, and when feasible, apportionment should be used to limit a defendant’s liability to that 
part of the harm of which defendant’s conduct has been a cause in fact. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 52, at 313–14 (4th ed. 1971). 
 109 See Sichelman, supra note 6, at 538 (providing a policy-based critique of “make whole” 
patent remedies and asserting that “make-whole remedies may impede efficient levels of innova-
tion”). 
 110 See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1547. Others have criticized this holding on policy grounds. See, 
e.g., CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PRO-
MOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 52 (2012) (noting that “when innovations are 
cumulative, interconnected, or exist in complementary relationships, a rule giving the entire sur-
plus to the inventor is not even conceptually possible”); see also Timothy Holbrook, Boundaries, 
Extraterritoriality, and Patent Infringement Damages, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1745, 1793 
(2017) (noting that “[i]t may be time to revisit the foreseeability/proximate cause aspect of Rite-
Hite”). 
 111 See e.g., Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1550 (stating that lost profits could apply to unpatented 
items that form a “functional unit” with the patented item); Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. 
Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 23 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (allowing lost profits damages for differ-
ent pieces of equipment in a rewinder assembly even though the patent only covered a single ma-
chine in that assembly). 
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seat to comity concerns when thinking about extraterritorial damages.112 
These topics, however, are beyond the scope of this Article and will be left 
for another day. 
Bringing the discussion back to Mentor Graphics, we can see that the 
opinion carried forward Rite-Hite’s misunderstanding of precedent. Mentor 
Graphics justified calculating lost profits relying solely on “but for” analy-
sis by citing Aro and Yale Lock and saying that “Section 284 damages ‘have 
been said to constitute the difference between [the patentee’s] pecuniary 
condition after the infringement, and what his condition would have been if 
the infringement had not occurred.’”113 
Just as in Rite-Hite, the Federal Circuit in Mentor Graphics made two 
mistakes. It failed to appreciate that Yale Lock applied a two-step approach 
to calculating lost profits that included apportionment. Also, the court did 
not understand that the comments regarding “but for” causation in Aro were 
an afterthought unrelated to the issue that the Supreme Court was address-
ing in that case. This mistake is easy to make today, and many modern 
commentators have perpetuated this misunderstanding.114 It is not too late, 
however, to correct the error. Either the Federal Circuit or the Supreme 
Court can take a closer look at these Supreme Court decisions now, and 
restore apportionment principles to lost profits calculations. 
D. “But For” ≠ Apportionment 
Unlike other modern decisions refusing to use apportionment in lost 
profits calculations, the original panel decision in Mentor Graphics conced-
ed that apportionment applied to all types of damages calculations, includ-
ing lost profits.115 The opinion took the odd position, however, that “but 
for” analysis somehow incorporates apportionment principles.116 Specifical-
                                                                                                                           
 112 Bernard Chao, Patent Imperialism, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 77, 83–86 (2014), https://
scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/
&httpsredir=1&article=1008&context=nulr_online [https://perma.cc/WSR5-XMZ7]; see also Car-
negie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (rejecting 
“but for” analysis that would allow patentees to capture damages for sales made abroad). 
 113 Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1283–84 (quoting Yale Lock, 117 U.S. at 552) (citing Aro, 
377 U.S. at 507). The decision went on to rely on Rite-Hite and Panduit. Id. at 1284–85. 
 114 See, e.g., Bernard Chao, The Infringement Continuum, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1359, 1397 
n.208 (2014); Ned Conley, An Economic Approach to Patent Damages, 15 AIPLA Q.J. 354, 368 
(1987) (citing articles to either or both Aro and Yale Lock for applying straightforward “but for” 
analysis); Jerry A. Hausman, Gregory K. Leonard & J. Gregory Sidak, Patent Damages and Real 
Options: How Judicial Characterization of Non-Infringing Alternatives Reduced Incentives to 
Innovate, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 825, 833 n.23 (2007). 
 115 Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1287. 
 116 See id. at 1288 (asserting that apportionment “was properly incorporated into the lost prof-
its analysis . . . through the Panduit factors”). 
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ly, the court said that, “Panduit’s requirement that patentees prove demand 
for the product as a whole and the absence of non-infringing alternatives 
ties lost profit damages to specific claim limitations and ensures that dam-
ages are commensurate with the value of the patented features.”117 As ex-
plained earlier, however, the Panduit factors simply reflect different specific 
aspects of “but for” causation.118 They do not reduce lost profit awards 
based on other factors that may contribute to a product’s success. 
Perhaps recognizing that the original panel’s analysis was flawed, an 
en banc session of the Federal Circuit denied rehearing on a wholly differ-
ent basis.119 Rather than suggesting that the Panduit factors somehow in-
corporated apportionment, the en banc opinion said that meeting the Pan-
duit factors satisfied the entire market value rule, making apportionment 
unnecessary.120 The entire market rule is neither apportionment nor a substi-
tute for it. Rather, the entire market rule says that if the patentee can show 
that “the patented feature drives the demand for an entire multi-component 
product, a patentee may be awarded damages as a percentage of revenues or 
profits attributable to the entire product.”121 Notably, the entire market rule 
only says when the “entire product” can be used, but not the appropriate 
“percentage.”122 That latter issue is a distinct question that apportionment 
answers. 
Yet the en banc opinion reasoned that the first two Panduit factors, 
“‘demand for the patented product’ (factor one) and an ‘absence of accepta-
ble noninfringing substitutes’ (factor two)”123 together contemplate “de-
mand for the patented product as a whole” as well as the particular features 
of the claimed invention in particular.124 Relying on these statements, the 
opinion concludes that “further apportionment is unnecessary.”125 The text 
of these factors belies the Federal Circuit’s reasoning. The two factors only 
discuss the infringing product but they fail to mention the specific infring-
                                                                                                                           
 117 Id. 
 118 See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. 
 119 Mentor Graphics II, 870 F.3d at 1300. 
 120 Id. The entire market value rule allows a patentee to obtain compensation based on the 
market price for a multicomponent product when their infringed-upon patent is only for one of the 
components. Yang, supra note 23, at 654. This rule puts the patentee in the position it would have 
been in without the infringement because without the infringement, the patentee could have made 
and sold its own multicomponent product. Id.; see also Mentor Graphics II, 870 F.3d at 1300. 
 121 See, e.g., LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 67 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(emphasis added). 
 122 Id. 
 123 Mentor Graphics II, 870 F.3d at 1300 (quoting Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1156). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
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ing features. Thus, there is no way for the Panduit test to consider the par-
ticular patented features. 
Instead, the first two Panduit factors serve the same function as the en-
tire market value rule. They serve to identify the universe of profits at issue 
—in other words, the correct base to consider. Like the entire market value 
rule, however, they do not say what portion of those profits should be ap-
portioned to the infringing feature. That is supposed to occur when the fact 
finder applies Yale Lock’s second step—apportionment. Unfortunately, that 
step has disappeared from the Federal Circuit’s lost profits jurisprudence. 
III. CALIBRATING DAMAGES 
This Article does not endorse the use of apportionment based on prec-
edent alone. There are several policy reasons that weigh in favor of using 
apportionment to calculate lost profits. Part III explains the reasons in favor 
of apportionment and criticizes the current method for calculating lost prof-
its.126 First, Part III explains how the Supreme Court has recently refused to 
allow patent holders to recover remedies on entire products in the context of 
both permanent injunctions and design patents.127 It then argues that by fail-
ing to focus on the infringing feature, lost profits law is inconsistent with 
how these other remedies value patent rights.128 Second, Part III explains 
why awarding lost profits on entire infringing products overcompensates 
patentees and disincentivizes complementary innovation.129 This can be 
particularly problematic because the current test allows for multiple “but 
for” causes. As a result, an infringer may ultimately be liable for multiple 
awards that sweep up all of a products’ profits. Third, Part III addresses the 
critics of apportionment by arguing that concerns about making patentees 
whole, although understandable, should not be prioritized over properly 
allocating innovation incentives.130 As part of this argument, Part III ex-
plains why the failure to apportion profits results in a very similar problem 
to that found in discussion of patent holdup.131 Fourth, Part III explains how 
basing lost profits on entire products leads to uneven treatment of similarly 
situated companies.132 Finally, Part III rejects Mentor Graphics Corp. v. 
                                                                                                                           
 126 See infra notes 134–195 and accompanying text. 
 127 See infra notes 136–152 and accompanying text. 
 128 See infra notes 153–160 and accompanying text. 
 129 See infra notes 161–182 and accompanying text. 
 130 See infra notes 183–193  and accompanying text. 
 131 See infra notes 187–188 and accompanying text. 
 132 See infra note 194 and accompanying text. 
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EVE-USA, Inc.’s conclusion that “but for” analysis somehow incorporates 
apportionment principles.133 
A. Infringing Feature << Infringing Product 
The primary policy reason for using apportionment is to properly cali-
brate lost profits awards to the value of the patented invention. It may seem 
self-evident that a patent on part of a product is entitled to a smaller reward 
than a patent on the entire product. Patentees have nonetheless repeatedly 
sought to obtain remedies based on the entire product when the patent cov-
ered just an aspect of the product. 
Allowing patentees a disproportionately large remedy harms innova-
tion by disincentivizing others from developing complementary technology 
that either builds on or works with other technology.134 To illustrate, imag-
ine giving the inventor of a fundamental television technology the right to 
capture all of the profits from any kind of television, even those that incor-
porate later-developed improvements. In other words, assume that any kind 
of television would infringe that patent. Other inventors would have no in-
centive to develop better televisions because the original patentee would get 
all of the profits. As a result, neither high definition television nor playback 
features would be invented until the original patent expired. These concerns 
should not be overemphasized because lost profits law does not affect inno-
vators nearly as much as the more common remedy of reasonable royal-
ties.135 The relatively infrequent use of lost profits law, however, should not 
prevent us from adopting rules that identify precisely what the patentee de-
serves. 
Recognizing this problem, the Supreme Court recently overturned two 
attempts to obtain remedies based on the entire product in the context of 
injunctions and design patent damages. The first such decision was eBay 
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. in 2006.136 For many years, courts automati-
cally awarded prevailing patentees a permanent injunction against further 
                                                                                                                           
 133 See infra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 134 See Scotchmer, supra note 9, at 32–33 (explaining that later innovators also need incen-
tives to build on patented technology); see also Amy L. Landers, Patent Claim Apportionment, 
Patentee Injury, and Sequential Invention, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 471, 504–09 (2012) (relying 
on the economics of cumulative invention to make the case for apportionment in calculating rea-
sonable royalties). 
 135 PWC, 2015 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: A CHANGE IN PATENTEE FORTUNES 8 (2015), 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2015-pwc-patent-litigation-study.
pdf [https://perma.cc/NGR6-G4TL] (finding that 81% of damages awards between 2005 and 2014 
contained a reasonable royalties component while only 31% contained a lost profits component). 
 136 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392–94 (2006). 
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infringement.137 That, however, gave patentees owning patents covering 
part of a product the ability to enjoin a company from making and selling 
the product as a whole. In some cases, infringers could redesign their prod-
ucts to exclude the infringing feature, but those costs might actually be 
higher than the value of the patented technology.138 In other cases, the pa-
tent may cover technology essential to making the larger product. Examples 
include patents on interfaces or patents essential to making products comply 
with different technical standards, or “standards essential patents.”139 These 
kinds of patents gave their owners the ability to “hold up” manufacturers 
and demand settlements that were far larger than the value the patented in-
vention actually contributed to the product.140 
Although the primary rationale underlying eBay was restoring tradi-
tional equitable principles to patent law injunctions, several Justices were 
also concerned about 
holdup.141 eBay requires 
courts to apply the same 
traditional four-factor 
test they use in other 
areas of the law when 
determining if an in-
junction should be is-
sued.142 Lower courts 
have interpreted eBay’s 
four-factor test as ensuring a focus on the infringing feature.143 Specifically, 
when assessing the first factor—whether continued infringement will cause 
the patentee irreparable harm—the Federal Circuit has held that there must 
                                                                                                                           
 137 Id. at 391 (discussing the prior rule granting permanent injunctions on infringement “ab-
sent exceptional circumstances”). 
 138 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 1991, 2002 (2007) (explaining when settlement values might be closer to redesign costs as 
opposed to the value of the contribution the patent makes to the overall product). 
 139 See Bernard Chao, Horizontal Innovation and Interface Patents, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 287, 
316 (describing, for example, why other companies want access to patents covering things like 
Apple’s interfaces that reach millions of Apple customers). 
 140 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 138, at 2008–10 (describing how injunctions against an 
entire product can result in patent holdup). 
 141 eBay, 547 U.S. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (joined by Stevens, Souter, and Brey-
er, JJ.) (suggesting that courts can avoid holdup by awarding damages instead of an injunction 
“[w]hen the patented invention is but a small component” of a larger product). 
 142 Id. at 391 (majority opinion). Those factors are: (1) whether the plaintiff has suffered an 
irreparable harm, (2) whether there is an adequate remedy at law, (3) the balance of hardships on 
the respective parties, and (4) whether granting an injunction would disservice the public interest. 
See id. 
 143 See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
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be a “causal nexus” between the infringing feature and demand for the in-
fringing product.144 This rule limits the problem of patent holdup.145 
In a suit between smartphone titans in the Northern District of Califor-
nia which began in 2011, Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc., a jury 
found that Samsung infringed various Apple design patents.146 The jury 
awarded Apple $399 million in damages, representing “the entire profit 
Samsung made from its sales of the infringing smartphones.”147 Consider 
one of the design patents involved (depicted above).148 The patent claim 
only covers the black, flat front face of the phone. The idea that the owner 
of a design patent covering a phone case can recover all of the profits of a 
product as complex as a smartphone makes no economic sense. As one 
scholar put it, “As applied to a modern, multicomponent product it drasti-
cally overcompensates the owners of design patents, and correspondingly 
undervalues technical innovation and manufacturing know-how.”149 Indeed, 
the huge Samsung jury verdict suggests that the tens of thousands of other 
patents that smartphones use have no value.150 
The Supreme Court wisely rejected the lower court’s ruling in Sam-
sung Electronics in 2016, holding that the term “article of manufacture” in 
35 U.S.C. § 289 could apply to “both a product sold to a consumer and a 
component of that product, whether sold separately or not.”151 The Court 
relied on a statutory construction unique to design patents, not on policy, 
and thus its decision does not have a broad impact on other areas of the law. 
Samsung Electronics, however, does advance an important policy goal. By 
                                                                                                                           
 144 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Unfortunately, 
the Federal Circuit subsequently watered down the causal nexus requirement in yet another 
smartphone decision. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 809 F.3d 633, 641 (Fed. Cir. 2015). This 
new standard is misguided. See Chao, Causation and Harm, supra note 4, at 74–76. 
 145 Chao, Causation and Harm, supra note 4, at 75–76. 
 146 Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 433 (2016). 
 147  Id. Although lost profits for infringement of the more common utility patents are focused 
on what the patent owners lost, the remedy for infringing a design patent allows recovery of the 
infringer’s profits. See 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2012) (stating the design patent infringer “shall be liable 
to the [patent] owner to the extent of his total profit, but not less than $250”). 
 148 U.S. Patent No. D618,677 S (issued June 29, 2010). 
 149 Mark A. Lemley, A Rational System of Design Patent Remedies, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 
219, 221 (2013); see also Peter Lee & Madhavi Sunder, The Law of Look and Feel, 90 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 529, 590 (2017) (positing that awarding all profits for design patent infringements “may 
vastly overcompensate [the patentee] and may not reflect the true economic contribution of the 
design to the product”). 
 150 See Steve Lohr, Apple-Samsung Case Shows Smartphone as Legal Magnet, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 25, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/technology/apple-samsung-case-shows-
smartphone-as-lawsuit-magnet.html (noting that “as many as 250,000 patents can be used to claim 
ownership of some technical or design element in a smartphone”). 
 151 Samsung, 137 S. Ct. at 436. 
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explaining that a design patent may only cover a part of a product, the new 
rule effectively requires courts to at least consider applying a form of appor-
tionment to the recovery of design patent damages.152 
By solely using “but for” analysis, Mentor Graphics accomplished 
precisely what both eBay and Samsung Electronics rejected. Mentor 
Graphics provided a remedy based on the entire infringing product and not 
only the patented feature. In contrast, one of the ways that eBay reduced 
patent holdup was to make it much harder for patent holders to prevent 
someone from obtaining an injunction against an entire product when the 
patent only covered a component of it.153 Likewise, Samsung Electronics 
reduced the likelihood that a design patent owner could recover all of the 
profits earned from an infringing product when the patent only covers one 
aspect of that product. Courts must now consider whether the article of 
manufacture covered by a design patent is simply a component. If it is, the 
patent holder will only recover profits attributable to that component, and 
not those attributable to the entire product. 
In contrast, relying exclusively on  “but for” analysis fails to distin-
guish between lost profits attributable to a feature and lost profits attributa-
ble to the entire product; under “but for” analysis, they are one and the 
same.154 The facts of Mentor Graphics clearly illustrate this point. Mentor 
Graphics obtained $36,417,661, which represents all of the profits that 
Mentor Graphics would have made but for the sale of Synposys’ infringing 
products.155 Presumably, the result would have been the same if the infring-
ing product incorporated technology covered by ten, or even one hundred, 
other patents.156 Indeed, Mentor Graphics did not even lower its damages 
                                                                                                                           
 152 See Sarah Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” in 1887, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 76 
(2017) (relying on a historical perspective to suggest that the “article of manufacture” in Samsung 
Electronics was not the entire smartphone but the “bezel and the screen conglomeration”). 
 153 See Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern In-
formation?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 795 (2007) (noting that “when injunctive relief is not well tai-
lored to the rights being protected, courts are left with the choice of giving no protection or giving 
too much protection”). 
 154 This was one of the primary reasons historical precedent used apportionment. See, e.g., 
Philp v. Nock, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 460, 462 (1873) (“Where the infringement is confined to a part 
of the thing sold, the recovery must be limited accordingly.”); Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 
(16 How.) 480, 489 (1853) (stating that “one who invents some improvement in the machinery of 
a mill could not claim that the profits of the whole mill should be the measure of damages for the 
use of his improvement”). 
 155 Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc., 851 F.3d 1275, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 156 These numbers are quite realistic, as Mentor Graphics apparently had over a hundred ac-
tive patents on emulation technology. Opening Brief and Addendum of Defendants-Appellants 
EVE-USA, Inc. at 48, Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d 1275 (Nos. 15-1470, 15-1554, 15-1556). The 
documents that supposedly illustrate this point were filed under seal and unavailable. 
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demand after it lost four of the five patents it had been asserting.157 In the 
“but for” damages world, prevailing on any one sufficiently important pa-
tent means that a patentee recovers all of the lost profits associated with the 
infringing product. 
Moreover, Synopsys was not allowed to introduce evidence that there 
were “multiple drivers of [customer] demand.”158 That information is irrel-
evant if the specific value of the infringing feature is not used to determine 
damages. This is not supposition; it is what the district court judge said: 
I am just saying you cannot apportion. When you start saying, 
“Here is how much of the purchase price for each sale was really 
driven by other features,” then other than on royalty, it doesn’t 
come up. That’s apportionment.159 
Of course, the end result is that the patentee recovers lost profits on the en-
tire product. This result clearly conflicts with the policy underlying both 
eBay and Samsung.160 If left standing, the rule will overcompensate patent 
holders and unnecessarily burden companies that make and sell multicom-
ponent products. 
B. Royalty Stacking 
A related critique of relying solely on “but for” lost profits analysis is 
the concern about overlapping patent rights. Here, the concern is not just 
about the outsized remedy that a patent on a single feature receives, but how 
that remedy interacts with all of the other patents involved in multicompo-
nent products. Modern technology products often use hundreds, if not hun-
dreds of thousands, of patented inventions.161 Those patents are often 
owned by many different parties. The “royalty stacking” problem occurs 
when these different patent owners demand higher aggregate royalties than 
                                                                                                                           
 157 Id. at 49. The documents underlying these statements were also under seal. 
 158 Transcript of Record of October 8, 2014, supra note 46 at 1649. 
 159 Id. at 1650. 
 160 This concern is not new and is one of the primary reasons that the Supreme Court adopted 
apportionment years ago. See Seymour, 57 U.S. at 490–91 (reversing a jury instruction that al-
lowed a patent holder to recover damages on the entire machine when the patent only covered an 
improvement). 
 161 See Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards, Standards-Setting Organizations and Intellec-
tual Property: A Survey of the Literature (with an Emphasis on Empirical Approaches), in 2 ANA-
LYTICAL METHODS: RESEARCH HANDBOOKS ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW (forthcoming) (manuscript at 8–9), https://dc.law.utah.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://
www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1010&context=scholarship [https://perma.cc/MCL4-FT2T] 
(listing studies that identified thousands to hundreds of thousands of patents that potentially cover 
various technical standards); see also Chao, The Infringement Continuum, supra note 114, at 1399; 
supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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they would have had they acted as a group.162 If the combination of patent 
licenses and damages awards become excessive, this will likely deter later 
innovation.163 That risk is only heightened when a single award amounts to 
all of the profits that a patent holder would have made. In Mentor Graphics, 
Synopsys raised one variation of this concern when it pointed out that prod-
ucts may contain many features patented by different companies, and each 
of those patented features could be a “but for” cause of a company’s 
sales.164 
The Federal Circuit in Mentor Graphics concluded that this situation 
was unrealistic because “[u]nder Panduit . . . there can only be one recovery 
of lost profits for any particular sale.”165 The opinion illustrated its point 
using a laptop example offered by Synopsys. In the example, customers 
demand a number of separate features in a laptop, including a high resolu-
tion screen, a responsive keyboard, a fast wireless network receiver, and an 
extended-life battery.166 The opinion reasoned that “[i]f each are patented by 
separate companies, and no manufacturer has the right to sell them all, then 
no manufacturer could obtain lost profits on such a laptop (none could satis-
fy the demand for everything).”167 The patentee can only recover a reasona-
ble royalty.168 On the other hand, if the only patented component is the ex-
tended life battery, “one patentee can obtain lost profits on the overall prod-
uct.”169 Thus, the court in Mentor Graphics reasoned that there can only be 
one patent that ever gives rise to lost profits recovery. 
The Federal Circuit’s analysis, however, is flawed on several levels. 
First, it fails to even discuss the more fundamental concern of royalty stack-
ing. Second, with respect to the narrower question of multiple “but for” caus-
es, the opinion fails to appreciate how the Panduit test creates a hypothetical 
world with no non-infringing alternatives. This hypothetical world looks dif-
ferent when different patents are at issue in a particular lawsuit. The result is 
that there may be different “but for” causes depending on what patent is being 
asserted. Alternatively, the opinion may actually be adding a new element to 
the Panduit test for lost profits that does not exist and makes little sense be-
                                                                                                                           
 162 Contreras, supra note 161, at 18–19. 
 163 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 138, at 2015–16 (“[T]he combined royalty burden as-
sociated with royalty stacking may make it unprofitable for the downstream firm to conduct the 
R&D and incur the other costs necessary to develop the product in question.”). 
 164 Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1289. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. at 1289–90. 
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cause it assumes knowledge that real-world companies do not possess. The 
following two subsections explain these arguments in further depth. 
1. Excessive Payments 
This subsection first addresses the larger concern: whether a single 
award based on all of a patent holder’s lost profits will force an infringer to 
pay excessive fees for all of the patent rights that it must acquire. Keep in 
mind that this problem exists even if we accept Mentor Graphics’ proposi-
tion that there is only one patented feature that drives consumers’ purchas-
ing decisions.170 Consider the situation in which the Federal Circuit deci-
sion is left standing and Synopsys pays Mentor Graphics the $36 million 
award in lost profits. If we use Mentor Graphics’ profits per emulator as a 
rough estimate of the profits that Synopsys made, the result is that Synopsys 
just paid all of its profits for a license to a single patent. 
This outcome makes little economic sense because a product’s entire 
value is not attributable to one patent. What happens when a third-party pa-
tent holder later approaches Synopsys, demanding that it license the third-
party patent because of past infringement? If Synopsys has already paid all 
of its profits to Mentor Graphics, then the payment of any additional royal-
ties will mean that Synopsys sold its emulators at a loss.171 Even if the other 
patented feature is relatively minor, that third-party patentee is still entitled 
to a royalty. In other words, it is quite possible that a manufacturer must 
obtain a license to a critical patent (i.e. if infringed would result in a lost 
profits award) in addition to less important patents (i.e. where lost profits 
are unavailable but a payment of a reasonable royalty is still required). If 
the infringer must pay all of the patentee’s lost profits for the use of the crit-
ical patent, that will eliminate crowd out the infringer’s ability to pay for 
other licenses and earn any profits. It will also prevent the infringer from 
earning a return on the investments it made in technologies that likely also 
contributed to the infringing product’s success.172 
                                                                                                                           
 170 Id. 
 171 The profits that defendant Synopsys earned are not necessarily the same as Mentor 
Graphics’ lost profits. In multicomponent contexts, however, there is no reason to believe that one 
party’s (the infringer or the patentee’s) profits will be systematically higher than the other’s. That 
is especially true when there is no evidence that the infringer avoided investing in research and 
development by copying. Thus, for simplicity’s sake, we can assume that their per product profit 
was roughly the same. 
 172 See Brian J. Love, Patentee Overcompensation and the Entire Market Value Rule, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 263, 264–65, 280 (2007) (noting that the entire market value rule causes a similar 
problem for reasonable royalty calculations and asserting that “if a producer of a complex product 
has already been compelled to pay a reasonable royalty to a patentee based on the entire value of 
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This analysis does not even consider all of the non-patent reasons why a 
product is profitable, which may include the company’s reputation.173 For 
example, Apple can charge a premium that other lesser known companies 
cannot. Larger profits are also obtained by taking greater risks. Companies 
can have trade secrets, better employees, and general know-how that all con-
tribute to the bottom line. A damages award that captures all of the infringer’s 
profits assumes that none of these factors contribute to a product’s success.174 
2. Multiple “But For” Causes 
The Federal Circuit has concluded that there can only be one patent 
that is the “but for” cause of lost profits. This issue, however, is less im-
portant than the royalty stacking problem. That is because the multiple “but 
for” problem undoubtedly occurs far less frequently than situations where a 
multicomponent product is covered by many less critical patents. For these 
cases, the problem is that a company will have to make both a hefty lost 
profits payment and many presumably smaller reasonable royalty payments. 
If there are multiple “but for” causes, the problem is magnified because the 
company will make multiple substantial lost profits payments. The Mentor 
Graphics decision relied heavily on the belief that there can be only one 
“but for” cause to reject apportionment. As discussed below, that analysis is 
wrong.175 
Mentor Graphics said that there can only be one “but for” cause be-
cause “there can only be one recovery of lost profits for any particular 
sale.”176 On its face, this conclusion seems quite plausible. Recall the laptop 
example. If a laptop manufacturer is infringing two separate patents cover-
ing a high-resolution screen and a fast-wireless network receiver, both pa-
tent holders will not be able to prove lost profits at the same time. Remem-
ber that, to recover lost profits, each patentee must show that if there had 
been no infringement, customers would have purchased the patentee’s 
products instead of the infringer’s products. If the owner of the high-
resolution screen patent, however, shows that the infringing manufacturer’s 
customer would have purchased its laptop, that means that the customer 
                                                                                                                           
the complex product, the producer has effectively compensated the patentee for the value contrib-
uted by each and every component of that product”). 
 173 See Lemley, supra note 24, at 663 (“Most commonly, other patents also contribute to [a] 
product . . . [and] know-how, materials, and marketing efforts almost always contribute some 
value.”) (citation omitted). 
 174 This is also inconsistent with the Yale Lock analysis discussed above. See supra notes 80–
82 and accompanying text. 
 175 See infra notes 176–182 and accompanying text. 
 176 Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1289. 
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would not have purchased the laptop from the owner of fast-wireless. The 
reverse is also true. If the evidence shows that the customer would have 
purchased a laptop from the owner of the fast-wireless patent, the evidence 
clearly cannot show that the customer would have purchased a laptop from 
the high-resolution screen patent holder. 
This analysis, however, assumes that the Panduit factors are attempt-
ing to determine what would have happened in the real world had there 
been no infringement. That is only partially true. The second Panduit factor 
modifies what is otherwise a real-world determination by pretending that 
“but for” the infringement, the infringer’s customers would not have chosen 
to purchase products from an infringing third party.177 The rationale for this 
modification makes sense. It allows the patentee to recover lost profits even 
when the infringer’s customers would have chosen a third party’s infringing 
products in the absence of the defendant’s infringement. An unforeseen 
consequence of this rule, however, is that juries in separate lawsuits may 
find different “but for” causes. In other words, one jury may find that an 
infringer’s customers would have purchased products from patentee A “but 
for” the infringement of patent A, while a second jury may find that the 
same customer would have purchased products from patentee B, but for the 
infringement of patent B. 
Consider Mentor Graphics’ laptop example in the context of two sepa-
rate lawsuits. Assume that the owner of the high-resolution screen patent 
sues the laptop manufacturer and shows that customers insist on purchasing 
laptops with high-resolution screens. This evidence will allow the patentee 
to prove that “but for” the infringement of the high-resolution screen patent, 
the infringer’s customers would have purchased the patentee’s laptop. The 
second Panduit factor prevents the jury from considering the possibility that 
customers would have purchased laptops from the other manufacturers (in-
cluding the fast-wireless patent holder) because they do not sell non-
infringing alternatives, or they do not have a license to the high-resolution 
screen patent. 
Now assume that the owner of the fast-wireless patent sues the same 
laptop manufacturer in a second and separate lawsuit. The owner of the fast-
wireless patent will also be able to present evidence that customers insist on 
purchasing laptops that have a fast-wireless connection. This evidence can 
be used to prove that “but for” the infringer’s sales, customers would have 
purchased laptops from the owner of the fast-wireless patent. Again, the 
                                                                                                                           
 177 Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978). The 
second factor asks whether non-infringing alternative products were available to the infringer’s 
customers. Id. 
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second Panduit factor prevents the jury from considering evidence that cus-
tomers would have purchased laptops from the owner of the high-resolution 
screen patent. That is because when Panduit asks about non-infringing al-
ternatives, the only relevant patent is the patent being asserted in the law-
suit. Thus, under the current lost profits test, it is quite possible to find that 
when a manufacturer infringes two different patents, it is causing two dif-
ferent patentees to lose sales. That means that a given manufacturer may 
end up paying two lost profits awards. If these awards are not apportioned, 
the payments would likely drive the manufacturer out of the market. 
The Federal Circuit’s ruling in Mentor Graphics could also be inter-
preted as trying to avoid the situation described above by creating a new 
legal rule that prevents the recognition of more than one “but for” cause. 
Mentor Graphics said that when a product consists of multiple important 
patents owned by different parties, “no manufacturer could obtain lost prof-
its on such a [product] (none could satisfy the demand for everything).”178 
This may be a new variation of the second Panduit factor, which requires 
patentees to prove the absence of acceptable non-infringing substitutes.179 
In practice, this factor limits the infringer’s ability to avoid paying lost prof-
its by arguing that customers would have purchased a competing product 
from a third party. If the third party’s products also infringe the patent at 
issue, they are not a legitimate alternative source, and they cannot prevent a 
lost profits recovery. In other words, even if true as a factual matter, the law 
will not allow an infringer to say “but for” the infringement, customers 
would have chosen a third party’s infringing products instead of the patent-
ee’s products. 
Mentor Graphics takes this analysis and applies it to the patentee. If 
the patentee’s products infringe some third-party patent, they are not a legit-
imate source for satisfying consumer demand. In other words, Mentor 
Graphics suggests that even if it is factually true that “but for” the in-
fringement, customers would have purchased the patentee’s products, the 
law should not permit a patentee to make that argument if those products 
also infringe another’s patent. 
From a purely doctrinal perspective, this new requirement has no basis 
in the law. It does not appear that any decision exists that requires a patentee 
to show that its products do not infringe other patents before it can recover 
lost profits. As a practical matter, this requirement would be impossible to 
implement. Patent assertions occur sequentially and many manufacturers do 
                                                                                                                           
 178 Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1289. 
 179 See Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1156. 
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not know about numerous important patents.180 In fact, patent holders have 
every reason to lie low.181 Thus, when lawsuits like Mentor Graphics go to 
trial, the parties may not be aware of the other important patents in the field. 
Moreover, even if they were aware of some of them, injecting third party 
patents into a patent lawsuit will make trials even more complicated. There 
will be disputes over whether these third patents are valid and infringed too. 
Adding this additional layer of complexity to what is already among the 
most expensive kinds of litigation would be highly undesirable.182 
C. Lost Profits Without Apportionment ≈ Injunction 
One scholar has argued that it is apportionment, and not “but for” cau-
sation damages, that is unfair because apportionment does not make patent-
ees whole.183 He points out that if juries were to apportion lost profits, the 
patentee would only recover a percentage “of the profit it would have made 
on sales that it would have it made but for [the] infringement.”184 That 
would leave the patentee “worse off than it would have been but for the in-
fringement.”185 Although this fairness critique is factually accurate, keep in 
mind that the goal of the patent system is not to enrich individual inventors, 
but to properly incentivize innovation.186 When products are made up of a 
single patented feature, such as some pharmaceutical drugs, weighing com-
peting interests is fairly straightforward. The landscape of modern multi-
component products, however, is far more complex. To simply restore pa-
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tentees to the place that they would have occupied prior to infringement 
would impede innovation in these industries. 
Unlike in the pharmaceutical industry, modern multicomponent prod-
ucts build on thousands and thousands of other innovations. Thus, it is im-
portant for patent law to consider how its rules will affect the kind of com-
plementary innovation that exists in the technology sector. Of course, when 
inventors use, or infringe, someone else’s patent, they still need to pay for 
the privilege. The remedies, however, should not be so powerful that they 
would give the patentee control over products that build upon its patent. 
That is particularly true when that patented feature is simply one of many 
thousands of different features. Outsized remedies for infringement of such 
features is what made issuing automatic injunctions to prevailing patentees 
so problematic prior to eBay. 187 It effectively allowed a patent on one fea-
ture to hold up a multicomponent product. 
Although there seems to be a general consensus that patent holdup can 
be a serious problem, failing to apportion lost profits presents substantially 
the same issue. When the law grants a permanent injunction against further 
sales of a product, it effectively gives the patentee control over that product. 
The patentee can then use the threat of the injunction to insist that the in-
fringer pay all, or nearly all, of the profits that it could make on that prod-
uct.188 Awarding a patentee all of the patentee’s lost profits associated with a 
multicomponent product gives the patentee a remedy of the same magnitude 
as an injunction. The difference is primarily one of timing. Injunctions al-
low a patentee leverage to negotiate a disproportionate share of the infring-
er’s future profits. Failing to apportion lost profits awards the patentee a 
disproportionate share of the infringer’s past profits. Indeed, in some cases, 
failing to apportion lost profits results in a stronger remedy than awarding 
an injunction. For example, when there is an injunction, the infringer can 
choose to redesign the infringing feature if those costs are lower than the 
licensing fee that the patentee demands. In effect, those design costs place 
an upward bound on the money the patentee can demand with an injunction. 
When the patentee is awarded lost profits without apportionment, however, 
it is too late to try to design around the patent. Therefore, the same upward 
bound does not exist. Regardless of the minor differences between injunc-
tions and unapportioned lost profits, however, the point is the same. For 
                                                                                                                           
 187 See supra notes 136–145 and accompanying text (discussing the eBay case). 
 188 Lemley & Shaprio, supra note 138, at 1994–2002 (detailing how the threat of injunction 
provides negotiating leverage). Although the model looks at negotiating leverage prior to litiga-
tion, modifying the chance of prevailing at litigation to 100% illustrates the leverage a patentee 
would have with a permanent injunction. 
1354 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1321 
multicomponent products, they are both outsized remedies that deter inno-
vation. 
In short, patent law needs to properly allocate incentives among the 
many different innovators that contribute to multicomponent products.189 
Importantly, most infringement does not result from copying, and we should 
not assign moral blame or punish the infringer in these cases. Most in-
fringement does not result from copying.190 Moreover, infringers often add 
their own contributions. That might take the form of creating unforeseen 
variations or simply adding new technology. The patent system needs to 
incentivize those that improve on existing technology.191 Apportioning lost 
profits serves this goal and properly balances incentives for different inno-
vators. 
Critics of apportionment rely on the idea of making inventors whole—
restoring them to the position that they would have occupied had there been 
no infringement. The law, however, should not concern itself with making 
inventors whole at the cost of harming innovation.192 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly made it clear that patent law is focused on the public 
interest, not individual enrichment.193 With that framework in mind, it is 
clear that patent law’s interest in apportioning lost profits is more compel-
ling than concerns about restoring individual inventors to the precise finan-
cial status that they would have been in absent infringement. 
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D. Ordering Effects and Equal Treatment of Licensees 
Yet another problem with refusing to apportion lost profits is that it 
leads to uneven and inequitable results, with some companies inevitably 
paying damages that are effectively apportioned, while others do not. This 
problem stems from the fact that companies learn about patents at different 
times. If we think about what happens when a third-party patentee licenses 
a different patented feature to the original patentee and not to the infringer, 
there are some surprisingly uneven consequences depending on when the 
license is executed. Consider what would have happened if the third-party 
patent holder in Mentor Graphics had licensed to Mentor Graphics before it 
sued Synopsys.194 Mentor Graphics’ per unit profit would have been small-
er, and any lost profits caused by Synopsys’ infringement would have been 
correspondingly smaller. In other words, Synopsys would have had to pay a 
smaller damages award because Mentor Graphics had taken a license to a 
third-party patent before the lawsuit. In effect, this is a kind of real world 
apportionment of lost profits. The infringer, Synopsys, pays a smaller 
amount in lost profits because some of the profits the patentee would have 
made are instead channeled to pay another patentee. 
The result is different if Mentor Graphics takes the license after its 
lawsuit with Synopsys. Because Mentor Graphics profits shrink after the 
lawsuit, those smaller profits cannot be used to reduce the damages Synop-
sys owes. The information was simply unavailable. The result is that the 
amount of lost profits damages an infringer like Synopsys pays to a patentee 
like Mentor Graphics depends on when the patentee takes its licenses to 
other third-party patent holders. The damages are higher if the patentee can 
somehow avoid obtaining the licenses it needs until its can recover lost 
profits damages on its own patents first. The time when a patent holder 
takes a license to other patented features, however, should have no effect on 
the damages the patent holder recovers. 
This uneven result is caused by the fact that Mentor Graphics awards 
the lost profits based on the entire product instead of just those attributable 
with the patented feature.195 The same result would not occur if courts ap-
portioned lost profits. Because Mentor Graphics would only recover lost 
profits attributable to the patented invention and not the entire product, pay-
ing royalties on other features would have no effect on Mentor Graphics’ 
recovery, regardless of when those payments took place. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article presents both doctrinal and policy cases for applying ap-
portionment to lost profits recovery. From a doctrinal perspective, Supreme 
Court precedent does not support an exclusive “but for” test, but rather a 
two-step test that includes both “but for” analysis and apportionment. From 
a policy perspective, it makes no economic sense to award a patentee all of 
the lost profits associated with an entire product when the patent only co-
vers a single feature. Such a rule overcompensates patentees and wrongly 
disincentivizes those that would make complementary technologies. 
The task of apportionment is not an easy one. The perfect should not, 
however, be the enemy of the good. As the Supreme Court said long ago 
about apportioning damages: 
It well may be that mathematical exactness [is] not possible, but 
. . . that degree of accuracy is not required but only reasonable 
approximation, which usually may be attained through the testi-
mony of experts and persons informed by observation and experi-
ence.196 
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